The paper is a defense of a strict form of anti-realism, competing the "in principle" form defended by Michael Dummett. It proposes to ground anti-realism on the basis of two principles ("immanence" and "implicitness") and to develop the consequences of these principles in the light of sub-structural logics.

Standard epistemic logic actually formalizes folk-psychology. The problem of logical omniscience shows that this logic is not adequate in a cognitivist setting. In order to describe realistic information-processing believers, we need both an ontology of particulars and a hyper-intensional taxonomy of representations. From this point of view, sub-structural logics, which do not overlook the syntaxic details of the processing of information, are an interesting alternative to possible worlds semantics.

According to the realist, the meaning of a declarative, non-indexical sentence is the condition under which it is true and the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence can obtain or fail to obtain independently of our capacity, even in principle, to recognize that it obtains or that fails to do so.1 In a series of papers, beginning with “Truth” in 1959, Michael Dummett challenged the position that the classical notion of truth-condition occupied as the central notion of a theory of meaning, (...) and proposed that it should be replaced by the anti-realist (and intuitionistic) notion of assertability-condition. Taken together with normalization results obtained by Dag Prawitz, Dummett’s work truly opened up the anti-realist challenge at the level of proof-theoretical semantics.2 There has been since numerous rejoinders from partisans of classical logic, which were at times met with by attempts at watering down the anti-realist challenge, e.g., by arguing that anti-realism does not necessarily entail the adoption of intuitionistic logic. Only a few anti-realists, such as Crispin Wright and Neil Tennant, tried to look instead in the other direction, towards a more radical version of anti-realism which would entail deeper revisions of classical logic than those recommended by intuitionists.3 In this paper, which is largely programmatic, we shall also argue in favour of a radical anti-realism which would be a genuine alternative to the traditional anti-realism of Dummett and Prawitz. The debate about anti-realism has by now more or less run out of breath and we wish to provide it with a new lease on life, by taking into account the profound changes that took place in proof theory during the intervening years. We have in mind in particular the considerable development within Gentzen-style proof theory of non-classical, substructural logics other than intuitionistic logic, which seriously opens up the possibility that anti-realism, when properly understood, might end up justifying another logic, and the development of closer links between proof theory and computational complexity theory that has renewed interest in a radical form of anti-realism, namely strict finitism. (shrink)

Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call "subjective consequence", i.e., the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and "objective consequence", i.e., grounding however allows for an interpretation according to which Bolzano advocates an "explicativist" conception of proof: proofs par excellence are those that reflect the (...) objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of demonstration. (shrink)

Logic and psychology overlap in judgment, inference and proof. The problems raised by this commonality are notoriously difficult, both from a historical and from a philosophical point of view. Sundholm has for a long time addressed these issues. His beautiful piece of work [A Century of Inference: 1837-1936] begins by summarizing the main difficulty in the usual provocative manner of the author: one can start, he says, by the act of knowledge to go to the object, as the Idealist does; (...) one can also start by the object to go to the act, in the Realist mood; never the two shall meet. He is himself inclined to accept the first perspective as the right one and he has eventually developed an original version of antirealism which starts, not from considerations about the publicity of meaning, in the manner of Dummett, but from an epistemic standpoint, trying to search in a non-Fregean tradition of analysis of judgement and cognate notions a way of founding constructivist semantics. The present paper ploughes the same field. We concentrate on the significance, for Sundholm’s program, of the perspective that has been opened by Twardowski in his important essay on acts and products (1912. (shrink)

The paper deals with the contributions of Jacques Herbrand to logic and philosophy in historical context.

This paper can be read as an attempt at providing philosophical foundations to linear logic. The only plausible form of philosophical antirealism deals with practical feasibility rather than with effectivity in principle. The very notion of recognizability is ambiguous, audit has to be considered from a stricter perspective than currently done. The intuitionistic assertability conditions are to be reinforced. This change requires a move towards a frame in which the circumstances of the application of a logical rule can be specified. (...) Gentzen's sequential calculi provide such a frame, when some structural rules have been removed or limited. (shrink)

Ranging from Alan Turing’s seminal 1936 paper to the latest work on Kolmogorov complexity and linear logic, this comprehensive new work clarifies the relationship between computability on the one hand and constructivity on the other. The authors argue that even though constructivists have largely shed Brouwer’s solipsistic attitude to logic, there remain points of disagreement to this day. Focusing on the growing pains computability experienced as it was forced to address the demands of rapidly expanding applications, the content maps the (...) developments following Turing’s ground-breaking linkage of computation and the machine, the resulting birth of complexity theory, the innovations of Kolmogorov complexity and resolving the dissonances between proof theoretical semantics and canonical proof feasibility. Finally, it explores one of the most fundamental questions concerning the interface between constructivity and computability: whether the theory of recursive functions is needed for a rigorous development of constructive mathematics. This volume contributes to the unity of science by overcoming disunities rather than offering an overarching framework. It posits that computability’s adoption of a classical, ontological point of view kept these imperatives separated. In studying the relationship between the two, it is a vital step forward in overcoming the disagreements and misunderstandings which stand in the way of a unifying view of logic. (shrink)

Philosophy of Probability provides a comprehensive introduction to theoretical issues that occupy a central position in disciplines ranging from philosophy of ...

According to foundationalism, mathematical propositions form a complex objective structure we have to discover and in which each proposition depends for its truth on the propositions that precede and ground it. Proofs that only establish the truth of their conclusions are contrasted with proofs that give also the objective reason of that truth. Foundationalism claims that the cognitive resources required by these proofs are universally available. This paper tries to undermine that claim and to show that foundationalism is a dead (...) end. (shrink)

Les sciences cognitives poursuivent un objectif fort ancien, qui consiste, sommairement dit, à décrire et à expliquer les comportements intelligents. Elles appliquent à cet effet des principes méthodologiques moins traditionnels, dont l'adoption définit ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le "tournant cognitif". Je me propose ici d'exposer brièvement ces principes, de les illustrer par des exemples appropriés et d’en discuter la signification philosophique. Pour l’essentiel, j’ai mis en avant un domaine qui me semble particulièrement pertinent pour les philosophes: l'analyse de la (...) catégorisation, c'est-à-dire du processus par lequel un ensemble d'entités (stimuli sonores ou visuels, objets concrets ou abstraits) en vient à être classifié en catégories séparées, qui peuvent être de type perceptif (phonèmes, couleurs) ou conceptuel (espèces naturelles, types d'événements, catégories esthétiques et morales). (shrink)

Bolzano fut le premier philosophe à établir une distinction explicite entre les procédés déductifs qui nous permettent de parvenir à la certitude d’une vérité et ceux qui fournissent son fondement objectif. La conception que Bolzano se fait du rapport entre ce que nous appelons ici, d’une part, « conséquence subjective », à savoir la relation de raison à conséquence épistémique et, d’autre part, la « conséquence objective », c’est-à-dire la fondation , suggère toutefois que Bolzano défendait une conception « explicativiste (...) » de la preuve : les preuves par excellence sont celles qui reflètent l’ordre de la fondation objective. Dans cet article nous faisons état des problèmes liés à une telle conception et argumentons en faveur d’une démarcation plus stricte entre la préoccupation ontologique et la préoccupation épistémologique dans l’élaboration d’une théorie de la preuve.Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call “subjective consequence”, i.e. the relation from epistemic reason to consequence and “objective consequence”, i.e. grounding however suggests that Bolzano advocated an “explicativist” conception of proof : proofs par excellence are those that reflect the objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of proof. (shrink)

Beth has tried to vindicate the kantian doctrine of mathematical intuition in the frame of contemporary logic. The paper proposes a critical evaluation of this attempt. The theory of mathematical intuition that is exposed in the Critic of Pure Reason is twofold: on one hand, the intuition of the "first principles", as it is analyzed in the Aesthetics, on the other hand, the intuition which is involved in the proofs, as it is analyzed in the Methodology. Contrasting with most defenders (...) of Kant, who try to show that the first kind of intuition remains, in some way, compatible with the non-euclidean geometries, Beth wants to defend the second kind of intuition, by suggesting that it is nothing else than the "instanciation" method, well-known in the predicate calculus. I show that this strategy of defending Kant is unsuccessful. (shrink)

W ciągu 30 lat dokonała się głęboka przemiana w relacji między Internetem a aktywnością naukową. Nastąpiło przesunięcie funkcji Internetu, który przestał być jedynie instrumentem współpracy akademickiej, a stał się również narzędziem używanym przez media społecznościowe, zezwalające na maksymalną dyfuzję irracjonalizmu i starego faktualizmu. Aby zrozumieć tę przemianę, należy ponownie zbadać mechanizmy zbieżności opinii. Wynika ona z istnienia wspólnego świata, który ukazuje nam te same fakty i determinuje nieustanną rewizję przekonań każdej osoby. W tym procesie asymptotycznej zbieżności opinii nie wymaga się (...) żadnej komunikacji między jednostkami. Oczywiście, jeśli fakty znane przez jednych są komunikowane innym, konwergencja znacznie przyspiesza, i to tak bardzo, że wiedzę musimy ująć jako rezultat zbiorowej aktywności, w której wymiana informacji jest jednym z jej istotnych źródeł. Z jednej strony takie poznawcze współdziałanie wydaje się naturalne i łatwe do implementacji. Biorąc pod uwagę właściwości informacji, które przechowujemy, nawet jeśli je udostępniamy, to dzielenie się informacją przestaje być przedmiotem zwykłych trudności związanych ze współpracą. Z drugiej strony takie współdziałanie jest produktywne z samej natury: współpraca między kimś, kto zna φ, i kimś, kto wie, że φ implikuje ψ u obydwu jako mających wiedzę ψ, której żaden z nich nie posiadał przed wymianą informacji. Wczesny Internet pozwolił na ekstremalną intensywność tej informacyjnej współpracy. Obecnie mamy do czynienia z odmienną sytuacją. Poszczególne wyznaczniki rosnącej porowatości między naukowcami a opinią publiczną wzmocniły rolę wymiany. Nie jest to już wymiana informacji, lecz wymiana opinii. Stronniczość tkwiąca w naturze ludzkiej, a szczególnie potwierdzenie tej stronniczości, prowadzi do odwrócenia relacji między faktami a opiniami. Szukamy faktów potwierdzających podzielane przez nas opinie, wątpiąc w te, które ich nie określają, i tworzymy fakty do potwierdzenia tego, o czym jesteśmy przekonani. Dlatego przechodzimy od współdziałania do przynależności, dzieląc Internet na homogeniczne grupy wyznawców. (shrink)

Résumé. En trente ans, le rapport d’Internet à l’entreprise scientifique a changé. Nous sommes passés d’un instrument de collaboration scientifique à un dispositif de réseaux sociaux qui assure la plus large diffusion à l’irrationalisme et à l’alt-factualisme. Pour comprendre ce changement, il convient de réexaminer les mécanismes de la convergence des opinions. La première source de cette convergence est l’existence d’un monde commun, qui nous expose aux mêmes faits et qui détermine par révision successive des croyances de chacun, sans que (...) la moindre communication soit requise, une convergence asymptotique des opinions, et ce quelles que soient les croyances de départ. Naturellement, si les faits connus par les uns sont communiqués aux autres, cette convergence s’accélère considérablement, si bien que nous devons considérer la connaissance comme le résultat d’une activité collective, et l’échange d’informations comme l’une de ses sources nécessaires. D’une part, cette coopération épistémique est naturelle et facilement implémentable : en vertu des propriétés caractéristiques de l’information, qui est un bien que nous conservons lorsque nous le donnons, le partage informationnel est exempt des difficultés qui affectent généralement la coopération. D’autre part, cette coopération est intrinsèquement productive : la collaboration entre celui qui sait que φ et celui qui sait que φ implique ψ met chacun des deux agents en possession de la connaissance de ψ, qui n’était pourtant détenue par personne avant l’échange. L’internet des débuts donne à cette coopération informationnelle une ampleur inégalée. La situation actuelle est différente. Un certain nombre de facteurs, dont la porosité croissante entre les scientifiques et le large public, ont mis au premier plan l’échange, non des informations factuelles, mais celui des opinions. Les biais notoires de la psychologie humaine, au premier rang desquels le biais de confirmation, tendent à inverser le rapport entre les faits et les opinions. On cherche les faits confirmant les opinions entretenues, on met en doute les faits récalcitrants et l’on crée des faits corroborants. En bref, on passe d’une problématique de la coopération à une logique de l’affiliation, segmentant l’internet en groupes doxastiques homogènes. (shrink)

RésuméSelon K. Gödel, les restrictions méthodologiques des constructivistes sont aberrantes, et le point de vue réaliste est beaucoup plus fécond: il est hi‐même parvenu à ses résultats logiques fondarnentaux en donnant une place à la notion de vérite, qui n'est pas de type combinatoire. Le premier théorème d'incomplétude est hi‐même un argument décisif en faveur du réalisme, si l'on accepte le principe d'«accessibilité» en vertu duquel nous pouvons décider de toutes les propriétés de nos constructions intellectuelles. Par ailleurs, il existe (...) un large spectre d'arguments permettant de statuer sur un énoncé indécidable dans un système formel. La thèse mécaniste, selon laquelle l'intelligence humaine peut être pensée sans distorsion significative sur le modèle d'une machine de Turing, est donc inacceptable.SummaryAccording to K. Gödel, the methodological restrictions of the constructivists are aberrant, and the realist point of view is much more fruitful. He reached these fundamental logical results himself by making place for a non‐cornbinatorial notion of truth. The first incompletness theorem is itself a decisive argument in favor of realism, provided that the principle of «accessibility» is accepted, by virtue of which we are capable of determining all the properties of our intellectual constructions. Moreover, there are numerous arguments that permit the evaluation of an undecidable statement in a formal system. The mechanistic thesis, according to which the functioning of the human mind, without significant distorsion, can be compared to a Turing machine, is now unacceptable.ZusammenfassungNach Gödel sind die methodologischen Einschränkungen der Konstruktivisten irrig, und er hält den realistischen Standpuukt für viel fruchtbarer. Er selbst erreichte seine grundlegenden logischen Ergebnisse dadurch, dass er Platz machte für einen nichtkombinatorischen Begriff der Wahrheit. Das erste Unvollständigkeitstheorem ist selbst ein entscheidendes Argument zugunsten des Realismus, sofern das «Zugänglichkeitsprinzip» akzeptiert wird, wonach wir fähig sind, alle Eigenschaften unserer intellektuellen Konstruktionen zu bestinmen. Zudem gibt es zahlreiche Argumente, die die Beurteilung einer unentscheidbaren Aussage in einem formalen System erlauben. Die mechanistische These, nach welcher das Funktionieren des menschlichen Geistes ohne wesentliche Verzerrung mit einer Turingmaschine verglichen werden kann, ist heute nicht mehr annehmbar. (shrink)

As regards cognitive capacities, the point of view of classical Artificial Intelligence has been much challenged by the so-called emergentist point of view. This paper attempts to outline,on the basis of logical considerations dealing with practical feasibility, a general theory of incompressible unfolding that is consonant with an old Leibnizian stance rather with the contemporary theory of complexity. I defend a variant of emergentism according to which any process that leads to endow a system with cognitive capacities is such an (...) incompressible unfolding. (shrink)

Entre les postes et le mouvement analytique, le principe de plaisir et l'histoire des télécommunications, la carte postale et la lettre volée, bref le transfert de Socrate à Freud, et au-delà. Cette satire de la littérature épistolaire devait être farcie - d'adresses, de codes postaux, de missives cryptées, de lettres anonymes, le tout confié à tant de modes, de genres et de tons.

The President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development examines three major ethical problems in the transition from post‐Communist Europe to a market economy and spells out the only real option for Western Europe. He delivered this address, which is reprinted with permission, at a Conference on Business and Moral Standards in Post Communist Europe held in London in November last year under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Westminster and sponsored by the Sedgwick Group and KPMG Peat Marwick.

"The four essays in this volume constitute Derrida's most explicit and sustained reflection on the art work as pictorial artifact, a reflection partly by way of philosophical aesthetics (Kant, Heidegger), partly by way of a commentary on art works and art scholarship (Van Gogh, Adami, Titus-Carmel). The illustrations are excellent, and the translators, who clearly see their work as both a rendering and a transformation, add yet another dimension to this richly layered composition. Indispensable to collections emphasizing art criticism and (...) aesthetics."--Alexander Gelley, Library Journal. (shrink)

Financing innovative and costly treatments in various therapeutic fields entails a number of problems in countries where costs are covered by public services. Providing these drugs is forcing actors to define the maximum sums of money society is willing to spend for given health improvements. This raises the question of whether maximum financing should vary according individuals’ circumstances, such as the rareness of a disease, lifestyles, social inequalities experienced over a life time, etc. This article examines a particular priority, namely (...) that given to the youngest patients, such prioritising usually refers to the “fair innings argument”. We question what could justify such a prioritization criterion. Three arguments are considered. At first we consider that FIA could be justified by the objective of equalizing the opportunities of well-being. Next, we proposed justifying the fair innings argument with the aim of equalizing the time provided to individuals to achieve their plan of life, in accordance with Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. Finally, we proposed considering the FIA as being justified because of the goal of equalizing the time provided to individuals to accept death. These three arguments, of course, have many limitations, some of which we have highlighted. This article doesn’t aim to convince about the superiority of one argument over the other ones. We seek to contribute to the discussions which could happen on prioritization criteria regarding health care, by making explicit what could justify one specific criterion: the age criterion. (shrink)

This text proposes an evaluation of what remains of cinema in the age of the digital, and of an ever increased circulation between movie theatres and museums. Much has changed in the social and aesthetic status of cinema, at least since the appearance of video art; but cinema, in general, has not disappeared, quite to the contrary, and remains a very important social practice. Two important factors, however, have undergone deep changes: 1°, film no longer has the exclusivity of the (...) moving image, which it has to share with television and contemporary art; 2°, the recent hegemony of the digital image has driven film toward a massive return to the “Méliès path” of film art, that of a direct intervention on the film image. The contention here is that, though the art of film is obviously not what it was, it has kept a number of qualities which still make it the positive reference for any thinking of the moving image in general. The article puts forward three kinds of reasons to support this argument: 1°, cinema has invented a specific way to see moving images, resting on what is termed here the production of a gaze; 2°, time is essential to the film form itself; 3°, film is the only art which has developed an aesthetic of the encounter (with the real) – and the co-presence of these three ranges of value remain absolutely specific. (shrink)

"The cinema is, as a photographic medium, an art form of light. But the mastery of lightning and the 'dark' side of his rhizomatic, interactive net have led very early to the configuration of shade and shadow and refer, ergo, to something which is perpetually related to all forms of figurative art. To film, 'night' means, however, something different, as it brings the configuration of the skies in a state of darkness with it. This is in disagreement with his usual (...) depiction. It entails embarking on a singular figurative project, which approximates a contradiction in itself. This project demonstrates the autonomy of the configuration process precisely through this contradiction.". (shrink)

This text proposes an evaluation of what remains of cinema in the age of the digital, and of an ever increased circulation between movie theatres and museums. Much has changed in the social and aesthetic status of cinema, at least since the appearance of video art; but cinema, in general, has not disappeared, quite to the contrary, and remains a very important social practice. Two important factors, however, have undergone deep changes: 1°, film no longer has the exclusivity of the (...) moving image, which it has to share with television and contemporary art; 2°, the recent hegemony of the digital image has driven film toward a massive return to the “Méliès path” of film art, that of a direct intervention on the film image. The contention here is that, though the art of film is obviously not what it was, it has kept a number of qualities which still make it the positive reference for any thinking of the moving image in general. The article puts forward three kinds of reasons to support this argument: 1°, cinema has invented a specific way to see moving images, resting on what is termed here the production of a gaze; 2°, time is essential to the film form itself; 3°, film is the only art which has developed an aesthetic of the encounter (with the real) – and the co-presence of these three ranges of value remain absolutely specific. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a general representation theory for MV-algebras. We furnish the appropriate categorical background to study this problem. Our guide line is the theory of classifying topoi of coherent extensions of universal algebra theories. Our main result corresponds, in the case of MV-algebras and MV-chains, to the representation of commutative rings with unit as rings of global sections of sheaves of local rings. We prove that any MV-algebra is isomorphic to the MV-algebra of all global sections of (...) a sheaf of MV-chains on a compact topological space. This result is intimately related to McNaughton’s theorem, and we explain why our representation theorem can be viewed as a vast generalization of McNaughton’s theorem. In spite of the language used in this abstract, we have written this paper in the hope that it can be read by experts in MV-algebras but not in sheaf theory, and conversely. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a general representation theory for MV-algebras. We furnish the appropriate categorical background to study this problem. Our guide line is the theory of classifying topoi of coherent extensions of universal algebra theories. Our main result corresponds, in the case of MV-algebras and MV-chains, to the representation of commutative rings with unit as rings of global sections of sheaves of local rings. We prove that any MV-algebra is isomorphic to the MV-algebra of all global sections of (...) a sheaf of MV-chains on a compact topological space. This result is intimately related to McNaughton’s theorem, and we explain why our representation theorem can be viewed as a vast generalization of McNaughton’s theorem. In spite of the language used in this abstract, we have written this paper in the hope that it can be read by experts in MV-algebras but not in sheaf theory, and conversely. (shrink)

In “A new proof of the completeness of the Lukasiewicz axioms” Chang proved that any totally ordered MV-algebra A was isomorphic to the segment \}\) of a totally ordered l-group with strong unit A *. This was done by the simple intuitive idea of putting denumerable copies of A on top of each other. Moreover, he also show that any such group G can be recovered from its segment since \^*}\), establishing an equivalence of categories. In “Interpretation of AF C (...) *-algebras in Lukasiewicz sentential calculus” Mundici extended this result to arbitrary MV-algebras and l-groups with strong unit. He takes the representation of A as a sub-direct product of chains A i, and observes that \ where \. Then he let A * be the l-subgroup generated by A inside \. He proves that this idea works, and establish an equivalence of categories in a rather elaborate way by means of his concept of good sequences and its complicated arithmetics. In this note, essentially self-contained except for Chang’s result, we give a simple proof of this equivalence taking advantage directly of the arithmetics of the the product l-group \, avoiding entirely the notion of good sequence. (shrink)

This volume brings together four of Jacques Derrida's essays on Maurice Blanchot's fictions: "Pace Not(s)," "Living on," "Title To Be Specified," and "The Law of Genre.".

"I shall speak of ghost, of flame, and of ashes." These are the first words of Jacques Derrida's lecture on Heidegger. It is again a question of Nazism--of what remains to be thought through of Nazism in general and of Heidegger's Nazism in particular. It is also "politics of spirit" which at the time people thought--they still want to today--to oppose to the inhuman. "Derrida's ruminations should intrigue anyone interested in Post-Structuralism. . . . . This study of Heidegger (...) is a fine example of how Derrida can make readers of philosophical texts notice difficult problems in almost imperceptible details of those texts."--David Hoy, London Review of Books "Will a more important book on Heidegger appear in our time? No, not unless Derrida continues to think and write in his spirit. . . . Let there be no mistake: this is not merely a brilliant book on Heidegger, it is thinking in the grand style."--David Farrell Krell, Research in Phenomenology "The analysis of Heidegger is brilliant, provocative, elusive."--Peter C. Hodgson, Religious Studies Review. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of twenty-three interviews given over the last two decades. It illustrates the extraordinary breadth of Derrida's concerns, touching upon such subjects as the teaching of philosophy, sexual difference and feminine identity, the media, AIDS, language and translation, nationalism, politics, and Derrida's early life and the history of his writings. Often, as in the interviews on Heidegger, on drugs, or on the nature of poetry, these interviews offer something available nowhere else in his work. The informality (...) of the interview process frequently leads to the most succinct and lucid explications of many of the most important and influential aspects of Derrida's thought. Sixteen of the interviews appear in English for the first time, including an interview conducted especially for this volume, concerning the recent exchange of letters in the New York Review of Books. (shrink)

Im Hinblick auf den Herbrand'schen Satz für die Prädikatenlogik der ersten Stufe und auf die Lehre vom Beweisverfahren mit Rechenautomaten, die daraus folgt, wird ein Beweis als komputazional synthetisch bezeichnet, wenn er sich auf Objekte bezieht, die im erwiesenen Satz nicht erwähnt sind. Die mathematischen Beweise sind aber auch synthetisch in einem begrifflichen Sinne: die Kontrolle oder die Begrenzung der angewandten Begriffe — die sogenannte Methodenreinheit — ist im allgemeinen unerreichbar.

The animal that therefore I am (more to follow) -- But as for me, who am I (following)? -- And say the animal responded -- I don't know why we are doing this.

SABINE CHOQUET. — Est-ce qu’il y a encore une chance pour que le mouvement souverainiste apparaisse comme un mouvement d’avenir ? Et si, pour vous, il n’est pas porteur d’un projet qui permette le développement du Québec, pouvez-vous nous en indiquer les raisons ?ALAIN DUBUC. — Je ne crois pas que le souverainisme soit un mouvement..

This brings together five pieces written by Jacques Derrida as extended lectures. The most important theme is Derrida's redefinition of speech acts and the 'event' as a particular kind of performative. The effects of globalization and mechanization, along with arising issues, provide a second constellation of themes. The first four essays involve a specific act of speech: the lie, the excuse, perjury and profession. The last two essays continue Derrida's powerful series of meditations on professional and institutional questions. The (...) final essay, 'Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul', confronts the task facing psychoanalysis today: coming to terms in new ways with worldwide cruelty and accommodating itself to the modern juridical concepts of crime against humanity. The phrase 'without alibi' (alibi, of course, being another speech act) is used throughout the essay as a leitmotif indicating that the responsibility psychoanalysis has to respond to globalization cannot be evaded. (shrink)

Recorded in Ithaca, NY by Cornell University., Sponsored by: Andrew D. White Professors-At-Large Program., Speaker: Professor of the History of Philosophy, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large., Lecture, October 3, 1988.

An edition of three essays by the leading French philosopher and theorist Jacques Derrida on the ethical, political and linguistic issues posed by the act of 'naming'. Passions: An Oblique Offering is a reflection on the question of the response, on the duty and obligation to respond, and on the possibility of not responding - which is to say, on the ethics and politics of responsibility. Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum) considers the problematics of naming and alterity, or transcendence, (...) raised inevitably by a rigorous negative theology. Much of the text is organised around close readings of the poetry of Angelus Silesius. The final essay, Khora, explores the problem of space or spacing, of the word 'khora' in Plato's Timaeus. Even as it places and makes possible nothing less than the whole world, 'khora' opens, dislocates and displaces all the categories that govern the production of that world, from naming to gender. (shrink)

Im Hinblick auf den Herbrand'schen Satz für die Prädikatenlogik der ersten Stufe und auf die Lehre vom Beweisverfahren mit Rechenautomaten, die daraus folgt, wird ein Beweis als komputazional synthetisch bezeichnet, wenn er sich auf Objekte bezieht, die im erwiesenen Satz nicht erwähnt sind. Die mathematischen Beweise sind aber auch synthetisch in einem begrifflichen Sinne: die Kontrolle oder die Begrenzung der angewandten Begriffe — die sogenannte Methodenreinheit — ist im allgemeinen unerreichbar.

We show the intimate relationship between McNaughton Theorem and the Chinese Remaindner Theorem for MV-algebras. We develop a very short and simple proof of McNaughton Theorem. The arguing is elementary and right out of the definitions. We exhibit the theorem as just an instance of the Chinese theorem. Since the variety of MV-algebras is arithmetic, the Chinese theorem holds for MV-algebras. However, to make this paper self-contained and entirely elementary, we include a simple proof of this theorem inspired in Ferraioli (...) and Lettieri (Math Logic Q 1:27–43, 2011). (shrink)

The following interview took place between Jacques Bouveresse and Hilary Putnam on May 11, 2001 in Paris at the Collège de France. Sandra Laugier was present, preserved the transcription, and proposed that we publish the text here. It was translated into English by Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec and lightly edited by Jacques Bouveresse, Juliet Floyd, and Sandra Laugier. Themes covered in the interview include the question of Wittgenstein’s importance in contemporary philosophy, Putnam’s development with respect to realism, especially (...) in philosophy of mathematics, and the differences and motivations for realism in mathematics, physics, and ethics. The editors thank Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec for her translation, and Jacques Bouveresse, Mario De Caro, and Sandra Laugier for permission to publish this transcription. (shrink)

One of Jacques Derrida’s richest and most provocative works, Life Death challenges and deconstructs one of the most deeply rooted dichotomies of Western thought: life and death. Here Derrida rethinks the traditional philosophical understanding of the relationship between life and death, undertaking multidisciplinary analyses of a range of topics, including philosophy, linguistics, and the life sciences. In seeking to understand the relationship between life and death, he engages in close readings of Freudian psychoanalysis, the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger, (...) French geneticist François Jacob, and epistemologist Georges Canguilhem. Derrida gave his “Life Death” seminar over fourteen sessions between 1975 and 1976 at the École normale supérieure in Paris as part of the preparation for students studying for the agrégation, a notoriously competitive qualifying exam. The theme for the exam that year was “Life and Death,” but Derrida made a critical modification to the title by dropping the coordinating conjunction. The resulting title of Life Death poses a philosophical question about the close relationship between life and death. Derrida argues that death must be considered neither as the opposite of life nor as the truth or fulfillment of it, but rather as that which both limits life and makes it possible. Through these captivating sessions, Derrida thus not only questions traditional understandings of the relationship between life and death, but also ultimately develops a new way of thinking about what he calls “life death.”. (shrink)